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Corruption, Ination and Growth
Keith Blackburn and Jonathan Powell
Centre for Growth and Business Cycles Research
Department of Economics, University of Manchester
Abstract
We study the e¤ects of corruption on growth through its e¤ects on
public nances. The embezzlement of tax revenues by public o¢ cials
leads the government to rely more on seigniorage to cover its expen-
ditures. This raises ination which depresses investment by virtue
of a cash-in-advance constraint. The result is a decrease in capital
accumulation and growth.
Keywords: Corruption, ination, seigniorage, growth.
JEL Clasication: D73, E6, H6, O42.
1 Introduction
This paper presents an analysis of the e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption on
economic growth from a public nance perspective. Corruption is modelled
as the embezzlement of public funds which leads to a loss of resources avail-
able to the government for nancing its expenditures. As a consequence, the
government is forced to rely on other sources of revenue, notably seigniorage.
This raises ination which acts as a tax on both consumption and investment
by virtue of a cash-in-advance constraint. The result is a fall in capital ac-
cumulation and growth.1 The predictions of the analysis are consistent with
several empirical observations - that is, a negative correlation between growth
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1A similar idea has been touched upon by others who point towards ine¢ ciencies in
the tax system (in particular, the prevalence of tax evasion) as an explanation of why
1
and ination/seigniorage (e.g., Adam and Bevan 2005; Andrés and Hernando
1997; Bose et al. 2007; De Gregorio 1993), a negative correlation between tax
revenues and corruption (e.g., Ghura 1998; Imam and Jacobs 2007; Tanzi and
Davoodi 1997), a positive correlation between ination/seigniorage and cor-
ruption (e.g., Al-Marhubi 2000), and a negative correlation between growth
and corruption (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong 2003; Keefer and Knack 1997; Li et
al. 2000; Mauro 1995).2
2 The model
We consider an economy in which there is a constant population (normalised
to one) of innitely-lived agents. The population is divided into a fraction,
 2 (0; 1), of private individuals (or households) and a remaining fraction, 1 
, of public o¢ cials (or bureaucrats). Each agent is endowed with one unit of
labour which is supplied inelastically to a particular occupation. Households
work for rms in the production of output, whilst bureaucrats work for the
government in the administration of public policy. A proportion,  2 (0; 1),
of bureaucrats engage in corruption by embezzling public funds which are
otherwise used to provide public goods and services. Firms, of which there
is a unit mass, hire labour from households, rent capital from all agents
and sell output to all agents in perfectly competitive markets. This set-up,
elaborated upon below, shares a number of features with other models that
serve to simplify the analysis in various ways.3
less developed countries are more prone to rely on inationary nance (e.g., De Gregorio
1993; Gupta 2008; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995). The present analysis focuses more on
bureaucratic malfeasance in the looting of public funds using a dynamic general equilibrium
model of corruption and growth.
2Of course, there are other possible explanations for these observations. For example,
high ination, high corruption and low growth may be the common symptoms of poor
quality governance and weak institutions, occurring independently of each other without
the causal links that our model implies. Similarly, corruption might lead to higher ination
but its negative e¤ect on growth may work through other channels, rather than through
the ination tax on which we focus. Finally, the observed relationships between variables
may reect reverse directions of causality that we do not consider. Further empirical work
is needed to assess these possibilities.
3Two features, in particular, are worth commenting on (see, for example, Blackburn
et al. (2006) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), and the references contained
therein). The rst is the decomposition of the population into a xed fraction of households
and a xed fraction of bureaucrats. The former are agents who lack the skills necessary
to become public o¢ cials, whilst the latter are agents who possess these skills and who
are induced to take up public o¢ ce by an allocation of talent condition established below.
The convenience of this is that we do not have to consider possible changes in the size
of the bureaucracy and possible changes in the level of corruption that may result from
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2.1 Agents
Each agent (whether a household or a bureaucrat) derives lifetime utility
according to
U =
X1
t=0
t[log(ct) + v(gt)]; (1)
( 2 (0; 1)) where ct denotes consumption and gt denotes public goods and
services.4 The agent is faced with the sequence of budget constraints,
ct +
Mt
Pt
+ at+1 = xt +
Mt 1
Pt
+ (1 + rt)at; (2)
and the sequence of cash-in-advance constraints,
Mt 1
Pt
 ct + at+1   at; (3)
whereMt denotes nominal money balances, at denotes real asset holdings, xt
denotes real income, Pt is the price level and rt is the real interest rate. As in
Stockman (1981), we assume that the cash-in-advance constraint applies to
purchases of both consumption and investment goods. The decision problem
for the agent is to maximise (1) subject to (2) and (3). This problem is solved
by the following set of rst-order and complementary slackness conditions:
1
ct
= 1t + 2t; (4)
1t + 2t = [(1 + rt+1)1t+1 + 2t+1]; (5)
(1 + t+1)1t = (1t+1 + 2t+1); (6)
2t

Mt 1
Pt
  ct   at+1 + at

= 0; 2t  0; ()  0; (7)
where 1+t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
(the gross rate of ination) and 1t (2t) is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (2) ((3)).
this. The second feature is the existence of at least some bureaucrats who are never
corrupt for one reason or another (e.g., a lack of prociency at being corrupt or a moral
indignation towards corrupt behaviour). The simplication in this case is that we are
able to determine bureaucratssalaries in a relatively straightforward way that does not
demand further assumptions about how public sector pay is decided. In addition, the
government is assured of receiving at least some tax revenues with which to nance its
expenditures.
4We assume logarithmic preferences over consumption for simplicity. Likewise, we
introduce public goods and services into the utility function, rather than the production
function, to cut down on some of the analysis.
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2.2 Firms
The representative rm produces output, yt, according to
yt = l

t k
1 
t z

t ; (8)
( > 0,  2 (0; 1)) where lt denotes labour, kt denotes capital and zt is an
index of technical knowledge. As in other endogenous growth models, the last
of these terms is approximated by the aggregate stock of capital which serves
to capture the positive externality e¤ects associated with learning-by-doing.
Labour and capital are hired at the competitively-determined real wage and
real rental rates, wt and rt, respectively. Assuming that output is taxed at
the constant proportional rate  2 (0; 1), prot maximisation implies
wt = (1  )l 1t k1 t zt =
(1  )yt
lt
; (9)
rt = (1  )(1  )lt k t zt =
(1  )(1  )yt
kt
: (10)
2.3 Government
The government makes expenditures on public goods and services, together
with bureaucratssalaries. The former is assumed to be a xed proportion
of output, gt =  yt ( 2 (0; 1)). The latter is given by (1   )wt, which is
the total cost of paying bureaucrats the same wage as they could earn in the
private sector.5 These expenditures are nanced by tax revenues from rms,
yt, and by printing money, Ht  Ht 1. We assume that each bureaucrat is
allocated the same amount of tax revenue, yt
1  , with which to provide public
goods and services. Non-corrupt bureaucrats, of whom there are (1 )(1 ),
comply with this objective, whilst corrupt bureaucrats, of whom there are
(1 ), pocket the revenues for themselves. It follows that the actual amount
of public funds available is (1   )yt.6 Let  denote the rate of monetary
5This equalisation between private and public sector pay arises from the fact that,
since bureaucrats are able to earn wt by working for rms, the government knows that
anyone who is willing to accept a salary less than this must be intending to obtain extra
income illegally. Given a su¢ cient punishment for such behaviour (e.g., the conscation
of all income), no corrupt bureaucrat would ever reveal himself in this way. The upshot is
that all bureaucrats are o¤ered wt, which is the minimum wage that induces non-corrupt
bureaucrats to take up public o¢ ce.
6Our results would not change if we were to allow the government to retrieve part of
its stolen revenues through some imperfect monitoring whereby corrupt bureaucrats faced
some probability of being apprehended. We abstract from this merely for simplicity.
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growth so that Ht = (1 + )Ht 1. Then the governments budget constraint
in real terms can be written as

1 + 

Ht
Pt
= (1  )wt +  yt   (1  )yt: (11)
3 Solution and results
We focus on the steady state balanced growth equilibrium of the model in
which all markets are clearing and all real variables (except employment and
the real interest rate) are growing at the same constant rate. In particular, we
have lt =  (labour market equilibrium), at = kt (capital market equilibrium)
and Mt = Ht (money market equilibrium).7 The balanced growth rate is
denoted by .
The conditions in (4)-(7) imply the following. From (4), since ct is growing
at the constant (gross) rate of 1 + , then 1t + 2t must be growing at the
rate (1 + ) 1 so that 1t + 2t = (1 + ) (1t+1 + 2t+1). Substituting this
into (5) gives (1 +    ) (1t+1 + 2t+1) = r1t+1 which shows that 1t
must, itself, be growing at the rate (1 + ) 1. In turn, this means that
2t must also be growing at this rate if it is non-zero. Re-writing (6) as
[(1 + t+1)(1 + )   ]1t+1 = 2t+1 reveals that, since 1t > 0 (because
the budget constraint is binding), 2t > 0 which establishes that the cash-
in-advance constraint is binding by virtue of (7). Given this, then ination
is constant and inversely related to growth according to
1 + 
1 + 
= 1 + ; (12)
which merely veries that real money balances grow at the rate .8 Finally,
combining (5) and (6) yields another expression in which growth and ination
are negatively related:
(1 +    )(1 + ) = r
2
1 + 
: (13)
With a binding cash-in-advance constraint, (3) gives Mt 1
Pt
= ct + at+1  
at so that (2) reduces to HtPt = xt + rkt in general equilibrium. At the
aggregate level, the term xt comprises the incomes of all households, wt,
7In addition, zt = kt so that (10) reduces to r = (1  )(1  ), which shows that
the interest rate is, indeed, constant.
8To be sure, note that (3) (under strict equality) can be written as Mt 1Pt = ct + at,
implying MtPt+1 = (1 + )(ct + at). Dividing one by the other gives the result in (12).
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plus the incomes of all non-corrupt bureaucrats, (1   )(1   )wt, plus the
incomes of all corrupt bureaucrats, (1   )  wt + yt1 . Thus, using (9),
xt =
h
(1 )

+ 
i
yt. Together with the expression for r in (10), this allows
us to write
Ht
Pt
=

(1  )

+  + (1  )(1  )

yt: (14)
In turn, (14) may be used in conjunction with (9) and (11) to obtain,

1 + 
=
(1  )(1  )+    (1  )
(1  )+ (1  )(1  ) +  : (15)
It is straightforward to show that the right-hand-side of (15) is increasing
in  (the fraction of bureaucrats who are corrupt). Since the left-hand-side
of (15) is obviously increasing in  (the rate of monetary growth), then 
and  are positively related. There are two e¤ects at work here, one of which
dominates the other. First, the more corrupt bureaucrats there are, the lower
is the amount of public funds available to nance public expenditures and
so the greater is the need to print money: this is reected in the numerator
of (15). Second, the higher is the incidence of corruption, the larger is the
ination tax base (i.e., aggregate real money holdings) and so the less is the
need for inationary nance: this is reected in the denominator of (15). It
turns out that the former e¤ect dominates the latter with the result that
higher levels of corruption lead to higher rates of monetary growth.9
Given the above, it is a short step to deduce the implications of corrup-
tion for the long-run performance of the economy. By virtue of (12) and
(13), we have (1 +    ) = r2
1+
. This shows that an increase in monetary
growth reduces real growth. It does so by causing an increase in ination
which depresses capital accumulation. As in Stockman (1981), ination dis-
courages investment by acting like a tax on both consumption and capital
goods, purchases of either of which require su¢ cient liquidity in accordance
with the cash-in-advance constraint.10 Now, to the extent that higher mon-
9In general, of course, a government could compensate for lost revenues in other ways,
such as increasing taxes and/or reducing public expenditures. One reason why countries
may wish to rely more on seigniorage is that it is seen as an easier option than scal ad-
justments which may be hindered by prior commitments, delayed through administration
and disliked because of political sensitivities. Nevertheless, there is an interesting question
as to the optimal combination of measures that would minimise the adverse impacts on
growth and welfare. To the extent that some inationary nance is part of this combina-
tion, the basic message of our analysis would not be changed: higher levels of corruption
would imply higher rates of ination with the consequences described below.
10E¤ectively, there is a double taxation of investment (or future consumption) - the rst
when money is used initially to purchase assets through which agents save, and the second
when money is used subsequently to purchase consumption goods out of this savings.
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etary growth rates are due to higher levels of corruption, there is an obvious
inference to be drawn - namely, that corruption has an adverse e¤ect on the
long-run development of the economy. In summary, corruption impedes real
economic growth by forcing the government to rely more on inationary -
nance which reduces capital accumulation through the tax that it imposes
on investment.11
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